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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
The measurement of inequality of opportunity is a growing topic in economics. In recent years many theoretical 
papers have been published and the number of empirical contributions to this literature has exploded in the last two 
decades. The increasing quality and availability of survey data will likely encourage further empirical research. Not 
surprisingly, journal articles and volume chapters have recently reviewed the main approaches to measuring 
inequality of opportunity and discussed the existing evidence. The aim of this paper is complementary to those 
contributions: it discusses the many practical issues that typically arise when measuring inequality of opportunity 
with survey data. 
The paper originates from lecture notes for the workshop “Measuring inequality of opportunity” held at ISSR, The 
University of Queensland in February 2016. The workshop aimed at covering the main issues of the applied 
literature on inequality of opportunity measurement. The material is presented in an attempt to attract the interest 
of a multidisciplinary audience of social scientists and therefore does not get into the details of some more technical 
aspects. For example, the discussion of inference (generally base on bootstrap) is absent. The comprehensive list of 
references provided may accommodate the needs of most demanding readers. 
The paper is organised in five sections. The first section introduces the ideal of equality of opportunity as it 
developed in the economic literature in the last decades. 
The second section discusses two approaches to measure inequality of opportunity. The first proposed by John 
Roemer and the second introduced by Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet. These two approaches quantify 
inequality of opportunity following a similar three-step method: i) define the properties that a distribution of 
valuable outcome –such as income or health– must have to satisfy the principle of equality of opportunity;  ii) obtain 
a counterfactual distribution of which reflects the violations of those properties in the actual distribution; iii) 
measure inequality in the counterfactual distribution of unfair inequality.  
The third section discusses alternative methods to measure inequality of opportunity. The literature has proposed 
two main approaches –a parametric and a non-parametric approach– both methods have advantages and 
shortcomings that are discussed in the section. 
The fourth section suggests two inequality measures that can be used to measure inequality in the estimated 
counterfactual distribution and discusses the effects of different choices. 
The last section is devoted to two more advanced topics. The first is a method to decompose total inequality of 
opportunity by sources, that is it introduce a method to identify the share of inequality of opportunity associated 
with a specific characteristics (gender, race, socioeconomic origin for example). The second is an index of economic 
development sensitive to inequality of opportunity –the Human Opportunity Index– which has been proposed and 
popularized by the World Bank.  
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1 The idea of equal opportunity
The large majority of politicians place equality of opportunity high on their agenda. It is possi-
ble to quote politicians with extremely different political orientations in support of equal opportu-
nity: from Margaret Thatcher1 to Raul Castro2, from Nelson Mandela3 to Nicolas Sarkozy4.
The are two important reasons that explain the popularity of this political ideal. Firstly, equality
of opportunity incorporates two fundamental ethical principles: equality and freedom. Secondly,
equality of opportunity is very frequently so vaguely stated to be uncontroversial.
What explains the fact that the term ‘equality of opportunity’ remains vague in the public de-
bate? Equality of opportunity merges two values: equality and freedom. Ideally, equality of op-
portunity is achieved when all individuals are free to choose from the same set of opportunities.
However, the principle of freedom and of equality are only partly compatible. Any precise defini-
tion of equality of opportunity represents one particular way to solve the incompatibility between
the two values: a way to balance between freedom and equality. The ability to balance and mitigate
these two fundamental values is probably the main reason that explains the popularity of the ideal
of equal opportunity. This became especially true after the end of the Cold War. On the one hand,
planned economies collapsed politically and economically because of the lack of freedom and in-
centives. On the other, the richer Western world become aware that economic prosperity was not
sufficient to guarantee equal chances of success for all, irrespective of race, sex and socioeconomic
origin.
However, when the exact meaning of equality of opportunity is detailed and pragmatically de-
fined, the result is a vast range of heterogeneous and conflicting definitions. Equal opportunity may
be understood as non-discrimination, prescribing that all individuals should be treated equally. To
this formal definition others oppose a substantive version of the same principle: equality of oppor-
tunity requires that all individuals have the same chances to obtain valuable outcomes. Contrary to
the formal equality of opportunity, the substantive version of the principle is very likely to entail
large, redistributive intervention.
1“First, that the pursuit of equality itself is a mirage. What’s more desirable and more practicable than the pursuit
of equality is the pursuit of equality of opportunity.” Speech to the Institute of SocioEconomic Studies, New York,
September, 15, 1975.
2“socialismo significa justicia social e igualdad, pero igualdad de derechos, de oportunidades, no de ingresos”,
speech at the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, La Habana, July 11, 2008.
3“I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal
of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony with equal opportunities.”, Speech On
his release addressing crowds from the balcony of Cape Town’s City Hall on February 11, 1990.
4“L’e´galite´ re`publicaine, c’est l’e´galite´ devant la loi, l’e´galite´ des droits et des devoirs, c’est l’e´gale dignite´ des
personnes, c’est l’e´galite´ des chances.” Speech at the l’Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, December 17, 2008.
1
In the economic literature since Rawls (1971), a number of authors have suggested that a society
in which social positions are formally available to everyone does not guarantee equal opportunity.
In Rawls’ view a “fair equal of opportunity” is realised only when equally talented individuals have
the same chance to obtain desirable social positions. This idea has been framed in many different
versions (Dworkin, 1981a,b; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Nozick, 1974) and has led to a number
of different definitions of equality of opportunity. The majority of these authors distinguish between
two types of sources of inequality: morally objectionable and morally acceptable sources. In what
follows we will focus on definitions that distinguish the two type of sources on the basis of two
types of personal traits: attributes for which it is morally correct to hold individuals responsible, and
those circumstances beyond individual control for which individuals should not be held responsible.
Inequality of opportunity arises only when, and to the extent in which, that inequality is due to
difference in circumstances beyond individual control.
Following the seminal contributions by Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey (2008), a number of mea-
sures of inequality of opportunity have been derived by different definitions of equal opportunity.
A measure of inequality of opportunity is a measure of how far a given distribution of individual
outcomes is from equal opportunity. Moreover, because Roemer’s and Fleurbaey’s measure of in-
equality of opportunity are easily implementable, the last two decades have witnessed an explosion
of empirical contributions proposing estimates of inequality of opportunity. Inequality of opportu-
nity has been measured in many dimensions of individual well being (income, consumption, health,
education) and for a large number of countries.5
2 Measures of unequal opportunities
A meaningful measure of inequality of opportunity is based on a precise definition of equal op-
portunity. All the measures presented in these notes are based on definitions which share an impor-
tant characteristic: they consider unproblematic any inequality due to responsibility characteristics
, while identifying inequality of opportunity as inequality due to variables beyond individual con-
trol. These approaches therefore share the assumption that it is possible to disentangle these two
types of individual characteristics. Other authors have suggested that such a distinction is impossi-
ble both in theory and in practice; an interesting discussion of this can be found in Fishkin (2014).
However, none of these definitions indicate which individual characteristics belong to the first type
5Note that there exists a distinct literature that has proposed measures of inequality of opportunity as measures of
inequality between opportunity sets. Because of its high level of abstractness, this literature has generated very few
empirical developments and are beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers can find a review of the theoretical
papers on this topic in Ferreira and Peragine (2015).
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of traits and which characteristics belong to the second. All theories presented in the following
sections consider that it is the society in question (or the social planner) that decides which factors
are to be classified as circumstances beyond individual control and which are to be considered to
be personal choices.
I attempt in this essay to propose a precise way that can organise our disparate views
about equal opportunity. More specifically, different people have different conceptions
about where the starting gate should be, or about the degrees to which individuals
should be held accountable for the outcome or advantage they eventually enjoy. My
purpose is to propose an algorithm which will enable a society to translate any such
views about personal accountability into a social policy that will implement a kind or
degree of equal opportunity consonant with that views.
Roemer (1998) p. 2
2.1 Roemer’s approach
Roemer (1998) represents the seminal contribution for the empirical literature on inequality
of opportunity. In his book, Roemer did not explicitly write down a definition of inequality of
opportunity. His theory proposes a criterion to select the redistributive policy that would equalize
opportunity in a society. However, his theory has been translated into more than one definition of
inequality of opportunity.
Roemer’s theory divides factors that determine individual outcomes into two types: factors over
which individuals have control, which he calls “effort”, and factors for which individuals cannot
be held responsible, which he calls “circumstances”. He defines a situation of equal opportunity
in the distribution of a certain desirable outcome – or “advantage”, to use his terminology – as the
situation in which individuals are compensated for the difference in their circumstances, insofar as
those differences affect the advantage they attain. To implement the equality of opportunity pol-
icy, Roemer proposes to partition the population into a set of types. A type is a set of individuals
characterised by exactly the same circumstances (gender, race, socioeconomic background,...). By
exerting effort, individuals in the same type have the same ability to transform resources into out-
comes. In his book, the focus is on equality of opportunity in education: educational outcome,
student circumstances and effort are used to exemplify the theory
I propose that the equal-opportunity policy must equalize, in some average sense yet
to be defined, the educational achievement of all types, but not equalize achievements
within type, which differ according to effort.
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Roemer (1998) p. 2
Roemer’s definition of equal opportunity can be formalised in a simple model. In a population
of N individuals the individual outcome of interest yi is the result of two sets of traits: circum-
stances beyond her control and responsibility characteristics. Circumstances belong to a finite set
{c1, ..., ck, ..., cn} = C, and E is the set of responsibility variables. Each circumstance ck can as-
sume φk values. All the possible combinations of values taken one at time from C define a partition
of the population into types. The partition is then made of a n types, where n = φ1×φ2× ...×φh.
To simplify our notation we can use c to indicate the categorical variable which indicates which
of the n types a given individual belongs to. Moreover fort the moment we will assume that effort
can be measured with a single scalar e.
For example if the two circumstances are sex (Male, Female) and race (White, Black) then c
assumes n = 2×2 = 4 values: {(White, Male), (Black, Male), (White, Female), (Black, Female)}.
This circumstance variable together with the effort exerted determine y, the outcome of interest:
yi = g(ci, ei)
The combination of circumstances beyond individual control defines a partition of the popula-
tion in n types: set of individuals sharing the same value of all circumstances, Y = (y1,., ..., yk,., ..., yn,.).
Similarly, the effort exerted divides the population in m mutually exclusive groups defined as
tranches, Y = (y.,1, ..., y.,j, ..., y,m). Individuals sharing same circumstances and effort belong
to the cell Y = (y1,1, ..., yk,j, ..., yn,m).
Table 1 represents the distribution of outcome Y in our simplified example with two circum-
stances assuming two values each, three possible values of effort and twelve individuals. Each row
of the matrix represents a type and each column a tranche.
Table 1: Y
c1 c2 c e = L e = M e = H
W M 1 y1,1 y1,2 y1,3
W F 2 y2,1 y2,2 y2,3
B M 3 y3,1 y3,2 y3,3
B F 4 y4,1 y4,2 y4,3
The literature that has derived measure of inequality of opportunity from Roemer’s theory has
proposed to quantify inequality of opportunity as inequality within tranches. By construction these
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measures assume value zero when all individuals exerting the same effort - in the same tranche -
obtain the same outcome.
This definition of equal opportunity has ben labeled ‘Roemer’s strong definition of equal op-
portunity’ (Lefranc et al., 2008; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011). This definition has been translated
in more than one measure of inequality of opportunity. One of the most well known and widely
adopted is the ex-post measure of inequality of opportunity introduced by Checchi and Peragine
(2010). They quantify unequal opportunity by measuring inequality in a counterfactual distribu-
tion obtained removing from the original distribution inequality between tranches. To this end they
evaluate inequality in the counterfactual distribution Y˜EP obtained replacing individual outcome
with:
y˜k,ji = y
k,j
i
µ
µj
, ∀i = 1, ..., N ∀k = 1, ..., n ∀j = 1, ..., n.
Where I is a generic measure of inequality, yk,ji is the outcome of individual i belonging to type
k and exerting effort j, µj is the average outcome of tranche j, and µ is the average outcome of
the population. Note that all tranches of the counterfactual distribution have the same mean, that
is inequality between tranches has been removed. Inequality of opportunity is inequality in the
counterfactual distribution:
IOpEP = I(Y˜EP )
This measures is obtained following the three steps:
1. define the properties that an outcome distribution must have to satisfy the principle of equality
of opportunity;
2. obtain a counterfactual distribution of which reflects the violations of those properties in the
actual distribution;
3. measure inequality in the counterfactual distribution of unfair inequality.
All measures of inequality of opportunity that we will discuss shortly are obtained following
the same three steps.
Note also that IOpEP is a measure of inequality of opportunity based on relative outcome dif-
ferences. If one is interested in an absolute approach, because he or she is dealing with health
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inequality, for example, the counterfactual distribution can easily be expressed in absolute terms6.
However, in the following we will always assume that we are interested in measuring inequality in
relative terms.
The Roemer’s strong definition of equal opportunity is a very demanding condition it implies
the distributions of outcome conditional on effort to be identical for all types. A second, less
demanding, definition of equal opportunity has been drawn from Roemer’s theory. The ‘weak
equality of opportunity’ criterion allows some inequality within tranches but requires that that mean
advantage levels should be the same across types (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011)7.
The ex-ante measure of inequality of opportunity proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010)
is a measure based on this weaker definition. The approach interprets the type-specific outcome
distribution as the opportunity set of individual belonging to each type. The (utilitarian) value of
the opportunity set of each type is the mean outcome of the type. Therefore inequality of opportu-
nity in this case is simply between-type inequality, the counterfactual distribution Y˜EA is obtained
replacing individual outcome with:
y˜k,ji = µ
k,. ,∀i = 1, ..., N ∀k = 1, ..., n ∀j = 1, ...,m
Where µk,. is the mean outcome of type k.
IOpEA = I(Y˜EA)
Adopting the ex-ante approach greatly simplifies the measurement of inequality of opportunity
which becomes equivalent to measure between-group inequality, nevertheless IOpEA is by far the
most popular measure of inequality of opportunity8.
2.2 Responsibility Sensitive Egalitarianism
A similar approach is proposed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet; their proposal originates from
a number of contributions on fair allocation and distributive justice (Fleurbaey, 1995; Fleurbaey,
6The ex post counterfactual distribution will be obtained as:
y˜k,ji = y
k,j
i − µ,j + µ , ∀i = 1, ..., N ∀k = 1, ..., n ∀j = 1, ..., n.
7An early contribution is Van de Gaer, 1993.
8Brunori et al. (2013) is a meta analysis of ex-ante inequality of opportunity measures in 41 countries. Today the
number would be probably above 60.
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2008; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2012). In these contributions the authors developed a theory of
“responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism” whose ambition is to generalise the egalitarian ideal allow-
ing individuals to be held responsible, to some degree, for their achievements. Again, individual
well-being is determined by circumstances beyond individual control and individual choices, gen-
erally identified with a “responsibility variable”. Two ethical principles define a fair distribution
of outcomes: the compensation principle and the reward principle. The first one states that any
inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control is unfair and should be eliminated. The
second specifies how final well-being should relate to responsibility characteristics. The principle
of reward is absent from the original formulation of equality of opportunity proposed by Roemer
and its meaning is less intuitive than the principle of compensation. The principle of reward clari-
fies what is the fair relationship between choices and outcomes. To what extent does a worker who
exerts twice the effort of a colleague deserve a higher salary? Should she obtain twice as much as
her colleague? Should the difference be determined by the difference in productivity?
There are many possible variants of the principle of reward. However, the majority of the au-
thors implicitly or explicitly supplement the principle of responsibility with a principle of neutrality
which prevents any redistribution that would go beyond the compensation of differences due to cir-
cumstances outside individual control. That is, given that inequality due to circumstances is zero,
the fair outcome distribution is the distribution that naturally arises from effort exerted. If the prin-
ciple of neutrality is agreed, then the definition of equal opportunity will satisfy the principle of
compensation and the principle of liberal reward (Fleurbaey, 2008).
How can one measure inequality of opportunity within the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian-
ism framework? The simplest discussion of this issue can be found in a paper published by Marc
Fleurbaey and Eric Schokkaert (2009). Although this paper is about inequality in health, the same
measures can be implemented for any dimension of well being. I suggest it as the first reference to
understand the approach; a more complete discussion is developed in Fleurbaey (2008).
In order to make an inequality measure sensitive to the problem of responsibility, Fleurbaey and
Shokkaert introduce two conditions:
Condition 1 (Reward, no influence of legitimate differences). A measure of unfair
inequality should not reflect legitimate variation in outcomes, i.e. inequalities
which are caused by differences in the responsibility variables.
Condition 2 (Compensation). If a measure of unfair inequality is zero, there
should be no illegitimate differences left, i.e. two individuals with the same value
for the responsibility variable should have the same outcome.
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Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) p. 75.
Putting together these requirements, we can state that a counterfactual distribution consistent
with the compensation and the reward principles is a distribution that:
1) fully reflects the outcome inequality between individuals with the same effort (within-tranche
inequality);
2) does not contain any outcome inequality between individuals characterized by same circum-
stances ( within-type inequality).
Any inequality measure applied to such distribution would be a measure of opportunity inequal-
ity consistent with both the reward and the compensation principle.
Note that Condition 1 and Condition 2 are equivalent to impose precise properties to the coun-
terfactual distribution. Condition 1 imposes that all individuals belonging to a type must be repre-
sented by the same value in Y˜ .
Property 1: y˜k,l. = y˜
k,h
. = λk ∀l, h = 1, ...,m and ∀k = 1, ..., n, where λk ∈ R
This is a logical consequence of removing all inequality due to effort from the distribution: if
we preserve some inequality within type in the distribution, we are including in inequality of op-
portunity some inequality which is due to choice.
Condition 2 imposes that the relative difference of values in the counterfactual distribution of
all individuals belonging to the same tranche should be equal to the relative difference original
outcome. That is to say we can write each tranche of the counterfactual distribution as the original
distribution divided by a real number.
The intuition of this property is that relative inequality within tranches should be entirely re-
flected in the counterfactual distribution. Obviously this property could be translated in absolute
terms if we were interested in absolute inequalities.
Property 2: s: y˜k,ji =
yk,ji
γj
∀j = 1, ...,m, where γj ∈ R .
It can be easily shown that it is impossible to construct a counterfactual distribution that sat-
isfies both conditions if the effect of circumstances on outcome is not independent of effort (See
Fleurbaey (2008) for a discussion on the meaning of this incompatibility). More precisely, such a
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counterfactual distribution can be obtained only if the function g(c, e) is product separable in effort
and circumstances9. A numerical example clarifies the point.
Table 2: Y
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3 4 4
WF 4 4 12
BM 4 6 11
BF 4 8 22
To satisfy Property 1 and Property 2 it should be possible to write the counterfactual distribution
so that:
Table 3: Y˜
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3/γ1 = λ1
4/γ2 = λ1
4/γ3 = λ1
WF 4/γ1 = λ2
4/γ2 = λ2
12/γ3 = λ2
BM 4/γ1 = λ3
6/γ2 = λ3
11/γ3 = λ3
BF 4/γ1 = λ4
8/γ2 = λ4
22/γ3 = λ4
Where γj and λi are any real number.
Consider the first two cells of the first column: 3/γ1 = λ1 and
4/γ1 = λ2 then we know that:
λ1/λ2 =
3
4
. However this is incompatible with what we obtain if we apply the same reasoning to the
first two cells of the second column from which λ1/λ2 = 1.
This is an important point: if what individuals obtain from their effort depends on their cir-
cumstances it is impossible to find a measure of inequality of opportunity that both satisfies the
compensation and the liberal reward principle.
IOpEP for example is consistent with the compensation principle (Condition 2) but not with
the reward principle (Condition 1). In fact the counterfactual distribution is obtained dividing the
outcome in each tranche by γj = µ
.,j
µ
. Unless the relative outcome of different types in all tranches
is the same, some inequality within types will be reflected in Y˜EP .
9Or is additively separable when we are dealing with absolute inequality,
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Likewise, Y˜EA satisfies Condition 1 (λk = µk,.). The counterfactual distribution does not reflect
any inequality within types, but conflicts with Condition 2 because, unless the relative outcome
of types is the same in all tranches, part of the inequality within tranches is not reflected in the
counterfactual distribution.
The two measures proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) explicitly attempt to find a
solution to this issue by mitigating the conflict between the principle of reward and the principle of
compensation. Each measure is fully consistent with one of the two and preserves consistency with
the other for a reference degree of effort or a reference type.
Direct unfairness (DU): choose a reference value for the the responsibility variable e˜. Then
y˜k,ji = g(ck, e˜) is the level of outcome attained by individuals in type k if they exert the
reference degree of effort. Inequality in the distribution of those outcomes, Y˜DU , is inequality
of opportunity.
Fairness gap (FG): choose a reference type c˜. Then y˜k,ji = y
k,j
i /g(c˜, ej), that is, inequality
of opportunity is inequality in the distribution of initial outcome divided by the outcome of
individuals in the same tranche with reference circumstance.
Note that IOpDU measures inequality in a counterfactual distribution obtained by removing any
inequality due to effort. All individuals belonging to the same type have the same value in Y˜DU.
Hence IOpDU is a measure of inequality of opportunity fully consistent with the principle of reward
(no influence of legitimate differences). On the other hand, IOpDU is consistent with the principle
of compensation for the reference degree of effort: if all individuals with the reference level of
effort obtain the same outcome inequality in Y˜DU is zero.
Symmetrically, IOpFG measures inequality in a counterfactual distribution obtained by isolating
inequality within tranches. It is a measure fully consistent with the principle of compensation:
inequality in Y˜FG is zero only if all individuals in the same tranche obtain the same outcome,
irrespectively of their circumstances. Moreover, IOpFG is consistent with the principle of reward
for the reference circumstance; IOpFG is insensitive to changes in inequality within individuals
characterized by reference circumstances.
In the example in Table 2 IOpFG and IOpDU differ and more importantly, we can find transfers
between individuals that imply changes in the opposite direction of the two indexes. Similarly, a
conflict can arise between IOpEP and IOpEA.
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Which counterfactual should be used? If we want our measure to always be consistent with the
principle of reward, then the choice is between IOpEA and IOpDU. The former is attractive because
we are used to understanding inequality as distance from the mean. IOpEA looks at inequality
between types’ mean and is therefore more intuitive than IOpDU which refers to a reference degree
of effort. However, Direct Unfairness is to be preferred when we have in mind a particular level
of effort to be the appropriate one. For example, when the outcome is health and the variable of
responsibility is the diet, authorities may have in mind an appropriate caloric intake. In this case,
IOpDU is attractive because we can calculate the measure, setting the appropriate caloric intake as
the reference responsibility variable. IOpDU satisfies both the principle of reward and the principle
of compensation for individuals choosing the recommended diet: when IOpDU = 0 inequality
between individuals following dietary guidelines is zero.
Similarly, when we want our measure to satisfy the principle of compensation, the choice is
between IOpEP and IOpFG. Both measure inequality of opportunity as inequality within-tranche.
However, the former is more intuitive because it defines within-tranche inequality in terms of dis-
tances from the mean, while the latter looks at distances from a reference combination of circum-
stances. That said, Fairness Gap may be more appropriate when we have a reference circumstance
in mind because it also satisfies the principle of reward for individuals in that reference type.
In my opinion, one should preferably have good reasons to opt for Direct Unfairness and Fair-
ness Gap. Although their axiomatic derivation is elegant, the resulting counterfactuals tend to be
very sensitive to the reference effort/circumstances chosen. Consider again our simplified example:
Table 4: Y
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3 4 4
WF 4 4 12
BM 4 6 11
BF 4 8 22
Tables 5 and 7 show how inequality is reflected in the the ex-ante and direct unfairness coun-
terfactual (when the reference effort is 3):
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Table 5: Y˜EA
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3.67 3.67 3.67
WF 6.67 6.67 6.67
BM 7 7 7
BF 11.33 11.33 11.33
Table 6: Y˜DU , e˜ = 3
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 4 4 4
WF 12 12 12
BM 11 11 11
BF 22 22 22
To see how Y˜DU can be sensitive to changes in the reference effort, consider what happens if
the reference effort is the lowest:
Table 7: Y˜DU , e˜ = 1
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3 3 3
WF 4 4 4
BM 4 4 4
BF 4 4 4
Because when using Y˜DU inequality of opportunity is inequality within the reference tranche
large differences in the outcome distribution across tranches imply high sensitivity of the measure
to the choice of the reference effort.
Tables 8 and 10 show the ex-post and fairness gap counterfactuals (when the reference combi-
nation of circumstances is WM.
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Table 8: Y˜EP
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 0.67 0.73 0.33
WF 1.07 0.73 0.98
BM 1.07 1.09 0.90
BF 1.07 1.45 1.80
Table 9: Y˜FG, c˜ = 1
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 1 1 1
WF 1.33 1 3
BM 1.33 1.5 2.75
BF 1.33 2 5.50
Consider what happens if the reference combination of circumstances is instead BF :
Table 10: Y˜FG, c˜ = 4
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 0.75 0.5 0.19
WF 1 0.5 0.54
BM 1 0.75 0.5
BF 1 1 1
Within-tranche inequality is not affected, instead within-type inequality (or between-tranche) is
much lower when c˜ = BF . This comes from the fact that within-type inequality is higher in type
4. When choosing the reference circumstances we are also implicitly setting the relative difference
in outcome due to effort that should not be considered inequality of opportunity.
To be consistent with the principle of compensation we will always violate liberal reward, that
is to say we will always include some between-tranche (within-type) inequality as part of inequality
of opportunity. In choosing the reference type, we impose which between-tranche inequality is not
to be considered inequality of opportunity, but fair return to effort. The lower between-tranche
inequality in the reference type, the higher the inequality in the Y˜FG.
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Consider two degree of effort j < m and the difference y˜k,j/y˜k,m reflected in Y˜FG:
y˜k,j/y˜k,m =
yk,j
yc˜,j
yk,m
yc˜,m
=
yk,j
yk,m
yc˜,m
yc˜,j
=
yk,j
yk,m
1
yc˜,j
yc˜,m
Now look at how y˜
k,j
y˜k,m
changes when 1/ yc˜,m
yc˜,j
varies:
• If 1/ yc˜,j
yc˜,m
= 1 then the entire difference yk,j/yk,m is reproduced in Y˜FG
• If 1/ yc˜,j
yc˜,m
> 1 only a share of the difference in the initial distribution will be considered
• if 1/ yc˜,j
yc˜,m
< 1 more than the original inequality is reproduced in Y˜FG
The last situation is especially counterintuitive: it shows that inequality in the counterfactual
distribution can be higher than inequality itself. However, this situation is impossible in practice if
we assume that the outcome is weakly increasing in effort yk,j ≤ yk,m ∀j ≤ m.
Finally, recall that the discussion above is based on an example in which we observe a single
individual in each cell. Table 11 shows a more realistic situation in which each cell contains a
different number of individuals. If we observe individuals sharing the same circumstances and
exerting the same effort, how then should we consider such variability? Is inequality within-cell
inequality due to effort or to opportunity?
Table 11: Y
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 2, 3, 4 4 3, 5
WF 4 3, 5, 6 12
BM 4 6 9, 11, 13
BF 2, 6 8 22
Is it more likely that this inequality arises from unobservable effort or from unobservable cir-
cumstances? Is it simply a measurement error which is convenient to ignore, that is replacing all
outcomes in the cell with their mean? The answer depends on our beliefs about circumstances and
effort observability: Lefranc et al. (2009) consider within-cell inequality to be due to luck, a source
of inequality of opportunity. On the contrary, the majority of the empirical contributions consider
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inequality within cell as due to effort. Checchi and Peragine (2010), for example, claim that this
inequality is due to limited effort observability and therefore should be attributed to effort.
In what follows we will endorse this latter view, assigning to each individual in type k exerting
effort j the average outcome of cell k, j. For us, within-cell inequality is not inequality of oppor-
tunity. However, we will discuss in a few footnotes how one should proceed to include within-cell
variability as part of inequality of opportunity.
In conclusion, we will discuss how to estimate four measures of inequality of opportunity–
two of which are fully consistent with the principle of reward (IOpEA and IOpDU) and two of
which are fully consistent with the principle of compensation (IOpEP and IOpFG). To obtain these
counterfactuals, the outcome of the individual i belonging to type k and tranche j is replaced with
a value y˜i as follows10:
IOpEA: y˜
k,j
i = µ
k,.
IOpEP: y˜
k,j
i =
µk,j
µ.,j
IOpDU: y˜
k,j
i = µ
k,e˜
IOpFG: y˜
k,j
i =
µk,j
µc˜,j
10When within-cell variability is considered a source of inequality of opportunity:
IOpEA: y˜
k,j
i = µ
k,. y
k,j
i
µk,j
IOpEP: y˜
k,j
i =
yk,ji
µ.,j
IOpDU: y˜
k,j
i = µ
k,e˜ y
k,j
i
µk,j
IOpFG: y˜
k,j
i =
yk,ji
µc˜,j
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3 Estimation
Estimating a measure of inequality of opportunity requires two preliminary steps: 1) to iden-
tify outcome, effort and circumstances beyond individual control, 2) to manipulate the original
distribution obtaining the counterfactual distribution that reflects inequality of opportunity.
Estimating a measure of inequality of opportunity requires two preliminary steps: 1) to identify
outcome, effort and circumstances beyond individual control, 2) to manipulate the original distri-
bution, thereby obtaining the counterfactual distribution that reflects inequality of opportunity.
3.1 Outcome, effort, circumstances
Inequality of opportunity should in principle be measured by looking at multidimensional wel-
fare measures. The majority of authors do agree that individuals should be held responsible for
their preferences on outcomes. If we measure inequality of opportunity in a single domain, we
may include part of inequality of opportunity some differences in outcome due to preferences (see
Decanq, et al. (2014) for a discussion). However, to measure inequality of opportunity taking into
consideration the multidimensionality of welfare is complex. Moreover, as suggested by Roemer
(1998), the level of abstractness of such a measure could limit its policy relevance. These con-
siderations explain why the majority of the empirical applications focus on a single dimension of
welfare.
Outcome
The typical outcome considered by the empirical literature is income (or consumption in poorer
countries), but measures of inequality of opportunity have been proposed for many other dimen-
sions: educational achievements (Gamboa and Waltenberg, 2012; Luongo, 2015), health (Li Donni
et al, 2014), credit market (Coco and Pignataro, 2013), and even international aid (Llavador and
Roemer, 2001), In principle one can imagine evaluating inequality of opportunity for any dimen-
sion of individual well being in which both circumstances and effort play a role. However, we
should always remember that when evaluating inequality of opportunity in a single dimension, we
are implicitly assuming that the outcome of interest is equally desirable for all individuals. The
majority of empirical studies have selected income, a largely accepted measure of individual well
being. Similarly, health and education may be easily considered appropriate outcomes. We cannot
extend this reasoning to any outcome, however. It would be very misleading, for example, to mea-
sure inequality of opportunity in consumption of cultural goods because it is difficult to claim that
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it represents an outcome that is equally desirable for everyone.
It is also problematic to measure inequality of opportunity for an outcome that cannot realis-
tically be considered a joint result of circumstances and choice, because it is clearly due only to
circumstances. For example, some scholars measure “inequality of opportunity of 10 year olds’
access to safe water” (Barros et al., 2013). Of course, it is difficult to hold children responsible for
not having access to safe water. We will return to this point later when discussing effort.
Note that the choice of the outcome does affect the population of interest. If for example we
were to choose individual earned income, it makes little sense to consider individuals out of the
labour market in the analysis. It might be preferable to consider instead only the working pop-
ulation. Similarly, an estimate of inequality of opportunity in educational achievements should
exclude all individuals that are still pursuing education. The choice of the outcome generally im-
plies a selection of the sample that will no longer represent the original population. It represents a
subsample of that original population with certain characteristics, typically the working age popu-
lation.
Circumstances
The choice of circumstances is a key aspect of any empirical analysis. In principle, we would
like to include all possible variables beyond individual control that affect the outcome. More pre-
cisely, we would like to include all circumstances beyond individual control that are sources of
unequal opportunity. These two statements are not equivalent. Consider for example the variable
‘age’, clearly a circumstance beyond individual control and an important determinant of welfare.
That said, should we include age among the sources of unequal opportunity? Should we instead
consider the meaning of equal opportunity in a lifetime perspective and exclude demographic fac-
tors from the sources of unequal opportunity?11. The distinction between sources of inequality of
opportunity and sources of other types of inequality is critical and should be carefully considered
case by case.
Unfortunately, in the applied literature the choice is largely driven by data availability. This
issue is not particularly troublesome for richer countries where we are often able to observe a large
11In some cases, even circumstances that do have an effect on the lifetime outcome may not be considered sources of
unequal opportunity: “We should not consider males disadvantaged with respect to females if, due to innate biological
factors, their life expectancy is shorter.” Roemer and Trannoy (2015) p. 277.
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number of circumstances. Consider for example the case of the estimates proposed by Bio¨rklund
et al. (2012) for Sweden. The set of observable characteristics they have been able to include
in their analysis is impressive; it includes detailed information about parental education, parental
income, body mass index during adolescence, intelligence quotient during adolescence and family
structure. In poorer countries the number of observable circumstances is often severely limited. In
both cases, only a subset of the circumstances that affect outcomes are observed.
Partial observability of circumstances is a source of bias for our measures. The literature has
discussed this issue only in a limited number of cases. We should first distinguish between IOpEA
and the other three measures of inequality of opportunity for which it is necessary to observe effort.
If we observe a subset of the circumstances beyond individual control, IOpEA is downward
biased. To see why, consider the example of the previous chapter:
Table 12: Y
c e = L e = M e = H
WM 3 4 5
WF 4 4 12
BM 4 6 11
BF 7 8 22
Now consider that it was possible to observe only race. The four columns would collapse to
two (with two individuals in each cell) and, because each one of the new columns is the weighted
average of the previous two, inequality would decrease12.
Table 13: Y
c e = L e = M e = H
W 3.5 4 8.5
W 3.5 4 8.5
B 5.5 7 16.5
B 5.5 7 16.5
This explains why IOpEA estimate has been and should always be presented as a “lower bound”
measure of the real level of inequality of opportunity.
12Provided that we use a Lorenz consistent inequality index (for a proof see Luongo (2011).
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The only cases in which we could get an upward biased estimate for IOpEA is the case in which
we include among circumstances variables of choice. A typical example is geographical area. If
we observe area of birth, this is clearly a circumstance beyond individual control. However, if we
observe area of residence this may not be a circumstance: the decision to migrate may be consid-
ered a way to exert effort in order to obtain higher outcome. Area of residence is only one of many
possible examples, depending on which variable we are considering, this discussion can get very
subtle. For example: can we consider religion a circumstance? In theory we are all free to embrace
or to abandon a faith. Should we consider, then, inequality between religious groups unproblem-
atic? Perhaps not. The discussion of this issue is an important one, but recall that the answer
always depends on the view of the “social planner” or the “society”. In empirical applications the
possibility that estimates are upward biases is warded off by choosing only circumstances that are
clearly exogenous (race, area of birth, parental characteristics).
The sign and magnitude of the bias due to imperfect information about circumstances on
IOpEP, IOpDU, IOpFG is not so immediately visible. We first consider the case in which effort
is perfectly observable. If the degree of effort individuals exert is known, inequality of opportunity
will again be a lower bound estimate of the real one. Consider again the example above (only race
is observable) and recall how the three measures are obtained: IOpDU is measured as inequality in
m replications of one of the three columns (indicated by the reference degree of effort), IOpEP is
inequality in the distribution obtained by dividing each cell of Table 13 by the mean outcome of its
column, and IOpFG is inequality in the distribution obtained by dividing each cell by the outcome
obtained by individuals in the same column and in the reference type. In all cases, inequality within
columns is lower than the inequality that would be measured in the original columns of Table 12.
Therefore when circumstances are not perfectly observable but effort is perfectly observable, the
estimate of inequality of opportunity is again a lower bound of the real no matter which measure
we adopt.
When neither circumstances nor effort are perfectly observable, the direction of the bias is
instead ambiguous. Luongo (2011) for example shows that when the number of effort tranches of
the counterfactual distribution is a subset of the real circumstances, IOpEP may be upward biased.
In this case, we can no longer claim that we are estimating a lower bound of the real inequality of
opportunity. Effort observability is a demanding condition that is often violated. In our example,
partial observability of effort is equivalent to a situation in which one is unsure about the column
individuals belong. Clearly, a swap of columns can bias our estimate in both directions.
Finally, if we include one or more variables of effort in the set of circumstances, we will also
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get a biased estimate of inequality of opportunity, no matter what measure we use. To get an
intuition of why it is the case consider that to confuse an effort variable for a circumstance has the
same effect than rearranging the distribution Y subtracting a column and increasing the number of
raws; total inequality remains the same but we cannot predict the sign of the change in the within-
column inequality (this could happen if we consider, for example, having a university degree as a
circumstance).
Table 14 summarises the discussion. Circumstances (C) and effort (E) can be observable or
only partly observable, and estimates can be unbiased, biased (unknown sign of bias) or lower
bound. To include the effort variable among circumstances is the worst situation (last column).
Table 14: Measures’ bias
measure C & E C & partly E partly C & E partly C & partly E E in C
IOpEA unbiased unbiased lower bound lower bound biased
IOpEP unbiased biased lower bound biased biased
IOpDU unbiased biased lower bound biased biased
IOpFG unbiased biased lower bound biased biased
We should be very careful when comparing estimates of inequality of opportunity in different
countries. Circumstance partial observability tends to bias downward our estimate. Circumstance
observability may be correlated with the quality of the data and the quality of the data with many
aspects of a country’s economic development. We could get a low estimate of inequality of oppor-
tunity in a very poor country because of the quality of the data.
Effort
Once we have identified the circumstances beyond individual control, we should identify effort.
In fact, it may be not necessary to observe effort if we limit our analysis to the estimation of ex-ante
inequality of opportunity. In fact (IOpEA) is based on the predicted outcome based on observable
circumstances. This choice is made by the large mjority of authors.
Roemer, for one, has proposed a method for identifying effort when it is not observable. His
method is based on two assumptions. First the outcome is assumed to be monotonically increasing
in effort. That is yk,1 < yk,2 < ... < yk,m for k = 1, ..., n. Second, the degree of effort exerted is
by definition a variable orthogonal to circumstances. In Roemer’s view, if individuals belonging to
different types face different incentives and constraints in exerting effort, this is to be considered a
characteristic of the type and therefore included among circumstances beyond individual control.
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A student with well educated parents may find it much easier to spend hours sitting at her desk,
while a student growing up in a less favourable environment may find it harder to study. Roemer
believes that that the distribution of effort is, indeed, a characteristic of the type:
Thus, in comparing efforts of individuals in different types, we should somehow ad-
just for the fact that those efforts are drawn from distributions which are different, a
difference for which individuals should not be held responsible.”
Roemer (2002) p. 458
Roemer therefore distinguishes between the ‘level of effort’ and the ‘degree of effort’ exerted by
an individual. The latter is the morally relevant variable of effort and is identified with the quantile
of the effort distribution for the type to which the individual belongs. In the example of effort
exerted by students, the relevant measure is not the hours a student works but rather the quantile of
type specific distribution of studying hours.
If effort is not observable but outcome is monotonically increasing in e we can identify the
degree of effort exerted by a given individual with the quantile of the outcome distribution she sits
at. The trick removes differences in effort that in Roemer’s view are due to circumstances beyond
individual control and it makes it possible to compare the effort exerted by individuals in different
types.
Note that this solution is impassable if the outcome of interest is measured with a dummy vari-
able: access to a service, probability to survive, etc. In such cases we cannot construct the type
specific distribution of outcome and therefore we cannot identify tranches. It may also be impossi-
ble in practice when the outcome is measured with a discrete variable which assumes few values.
In some cases effort variables may be at least in part observable. When measuring inequality
of opportunity in health, for example, a number of behaviours may be considered a proxy for effort
(smoking, drinking, physical activity). In such cases we can consider the effect of one or more of
these variables on the outcome as due to effort.
Even if an effort variable is observable, such as smoking behaviour, one can decide to stick to
the Roemer assumption of orthogonality of types and effort and again define the quantile of the
smoking behaviour as the appropriate effort variable. The same identification strategy cannot be
adopted when we observe more than one effort variable. If we observe both drinking and smoking
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behaviour, for example, it is far from obvious how we should construct quantiles of the type spe-
cific distribution of such a two-dimensional effort.
When assuming that a certain variable is a responsibility characteristic, we should always bear
in mind the meaning of our assumption. Consider one of the components of the Opportunity Human
Development Index calculated by the World Bank: access to safe water for 10-year-old children. I
personally consider it a bizzare exercise to estimate inequality of opportunity in such a dimension.
Can we consider some part of the total inequality in access to safe water as due to responsibility
variables? Can a 10-year-old be considered responsible for any outcome?
One of the questions here is at what age can we start to consider a child responsible for the effort
she exerts. A good benchmark for such a discussion is the legal literature on criminal responsibility.
After all, if at a certain age individuals are held legally responsible for their actions, the same
principle could be implemented when measuring inequality of opportunity. In OECD countries the
minimum age to be brought to court varies around an average of 13 years13. We should therefore
be very careful when deciding to measure inequality of opportunity for children (many papers have
for example exploited PISA data on 15-year-old students to assess inequality of opportunity in
education). When a sufficiently rich dataset is available, one can try to overcome this problem, for
example by including among circumstances the individual outcome before the age of responsibility.
This is the choice of Brunori et al., (2013) in estimating inequality of opportunity in access to
university. In the data used, there is information about school performance at different stages of
the school curriculum. In that case, the test score at 19 years of age is considered the relevant
variable of effort, but the degree of effort is defined as the quantile of the type specific test score
distribution. And the test score at 14 years of age is included among circumstances. In doing so,
one can partially control for the effort exerted when the student could not be considered responsible
for her choice.
Measures of unequal opportunity for outcome of children have been justified on two distinct
grounds. Firstly, if a child cannot be considered responsible for her choices, her parents may
be. Secondly, it has been suggested that such measures are not intended to measure inequality of
opportunity, but should rather be interpreted as measures of inequality in which inequality is more
heavily weighted when correlated with circumstance beyond individual control. Suppose we have
two societies with same average access to safe water for 10-year-olds; in one society the average
access is the same for all ethnic groups, while in the other all individuals in ethnic minorities have
no access to safe water. We should rank inequality in the latter more harmful than inequality in the
13More on this can be found in Melchiorre (2004).
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former14.
The first point is reasonable, however, if the individual exerting effort is the parent and the
outcome is her child’s access to safe water. In that case, the analysis should be based on the par-
ents’ circumstances beyond individual control and not on the child’s (I do not know any empirical
application that chooses this solution). The second argument - that inequality correlated with cir-
cumstances should be considered more harmful - is also reasonable, but we should be aware that
the estimate we obtain is not a measure of inequality of opportunity, but rather a measure of the
degree of inequality in that coverage across type.
After outcome, circumstances and effort have been identified, the following step consists in
estimating the counterfactual distribution. The counterfactual distribution, Yˆ , is the distribution of
unfair inequalities. Yˆ can be estimated parametrically or non-parametrically. More rarely, it can
be semi-parametrically estimated, an approach which is not covered here (for those interested, see
Pistolesi (2009)).
After outcome, circumstances and effort have been identified the following step consists in
estimating the counterfactual distribution. The counterfactual distribution, Yˆ , is the distribution of
unfair inequalities. Yˆ can be estimated parametrically or non-parametrically. More rare is the case
of semi-parametric estimation which is not covered here (if interested see Pistolesi (2009)).
3.2 Non-parametric approach
The non parametric approach, proposed first by Checchi and Peragine (2010) to estimate IOpEA
and IOpEP, consists in partitioning the sample into types based on all observable circumstances, and
then further partitioning each type into tranches (quantile of the type specific outcome distribution).
In order to obtain the two counterfactual distributions (Y˜EA, Y˜EP ) we must first estimate with
precision the average outcome of each cell (µk,j). This implies the need for a sufficient number of
observations in each type, so that we can divide them into tranches (and for each tranche we would
also like to have a sufficient sample size to estimate the average outcome). This can be difficult
in practice. Recall that the number of types that partition the population is the combination of the
values of all circumstances. If we have four circumstances assuming five values, we will have 625
types. With six circumstances assuming five values, we get 15,625 types, and the sample size of
our data is likely to be smaller than this. The number of cells of a partition based on n dummies
that describe circumstance and m tranches is 2n ×m.
14While many would agree on this point, a much more complicated issue is how average coverage and inequality
between group can be traded-off in an aggregated measure.
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Data availability dramatically drives the estimation of the counterfactual distribution when
adopting a non-parametric approach. If we have a small dataset, an option is to estimate only
IOpEA. In this case we do not need to identify effort because inequality of opportunity collapses to
a between-type inequality. For a reliable estimate we simply need a sufficient sample size in each
type to calculate its mean outcome.
If instead we are interested in evaluating both reward-consistent and compensation-consistent
measures of unequal opportunity, the only option we have is to limit the set of circumstances and
tranches used. With a sample size of a few thousand, it is unrealistic to imagine a partition in
more than some dozens of types. This is especially true because individuals are, as a rule, not
uniformly distributed across the partition. If two or more circumstances are correlated it is very
unlikely to observe some of their combinations. A typical case that arises when dealing with richer
countries: we select parental education and parental occupation as circumstances. Unfortunately
these two variables are strongly correlated and there are very few individuals whose parents are
highly educated and employed in elementary occupations or who have no education but work as
managers. Similarly, when dealing with poorer countries and including ethnicity and area of birth
among circumstances: if ethnic groups are segregated in the country, we will find many empty
types. Sparsely populated types are not a problem per se, but they threaten the reliability of the
estimated counterfactual distribution.
It is clear therefore that in many cases we should limit the number of circumstances we use
to define types. More frequently the values that describe circumstances are recoded reducing
their variability. Districts of birth are aggregated in macro-region, parental occupations become
a dummy for white/blue collar, ethnicity becomes a dummy for minorities. This point is particu-
larly interesting because the literature has devoted a lot of attention to discuss the consequences of
partial observability on our estimates and much less attention to the reliability of estimates. If one
looks carefully at the empirical application, she may instead conclude that partial observability is
a less relevant issue than estimate precision. Even when a comprehensive set of circumstances is
available, we end up using only a subset of them.
What should guide our choice of circumstances, then? In principle we should give priority to
the circumstance that explain the largest part of total inequality. A preliminary and quick exercise
consists of running as many regressions as potential circumstances and looking at how R2 changes
after the exclusion of each variable. A proper way to obtain a reliable decomposition of total in-
equality by source in the context of inequality of opportunity measurement is discussed in Section
5.1.
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3.2.1 Opportunity profile
When evaluating inequality of opportunity together with the typical tables of descriptive statis-
tics of variables used in the study, there is another interesting figure worth including in the descrip-
tion of the data. The term opportunity profile introduced by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) indicates
a table containing information of types ranked by their mean level of advantage. This table gen-
erally includes for each type: the value of the circumstance variables, the average outcome, and
the population share. Because in many empirical applications the mean outcome of small types
can be calculated with low accuracy, I believe we should also include the sample size of each type
and - with the risk of making the table less immediately readable - the standard error for the mean
outcome. The aim of the opportunity profiles table is to give an intuition of what characteristics
drive the ranking of types. And they can be extremely informative. Table 15 shows the important
role of parental occupation in determining individual outcome in the United Kingdom.
Table 15: United Kingdom opportunity profile
rank sex parental occupation parental education sample avg income sd population share
1 Male elementary occupation low 48 16,992.55 263.14 0.0069
2 Male elementary occupation high 4 17,787.69 2,234.30 0.0005
3 Female Skilled manual low 289 18,040.42 78.49 0.0426
4 Female Highly skilled non-manual low 1108 18,552.54 17.40 0.1576
5 Male Skilled manual high 87 18,575.54 160.14 0.0135
6 Female elementary occupation low 70 19,312.76 256.66 0.0096
7 Female Lower skilled non-manual low 508 19,738.67 33.33 0.0732
8 Male Highly skilled non-manual low 905 19,859.69 24.00 0.1445
9 Female elementary occupation high 7 19,965.84 1,987.68 0.0008
10 Male Lower skilled non-manual high 290 21,441.11 56.62 0.0443
11 Male Skilled manual low 231 21,829.35 133.14 0.0384
12 Female Lower skilled non-manual high 405 22,436.48 61.33 0.0609
13 Male Lower skilled non-manual low 408 22,559.41 56.63 0.0620
14 Female Highly skilled non-manual high 1158 24,609.11 23.44 0.1699
15 Female Skilled manual high 113 25,327.47 585.96 0.0159
16 Male Highly skilled non-manual high 967 25,847.95 34.45 0.1597
Source: EUSILC, 2011.
The opportunity profile is a natural way to present the data when estimating inequality of op-
portunity non-parametrically. In this case the profile is the counterfactual distribution Y˜EA and has
a direct link with the aggregated measure of unequal opportunity. Moreover, this way of present-
ing the data gives an idea of the reliability of the counterfactual distribution. A large number of
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small types should make us suspicious about the reliability of analysis, especially when they tend
to crowd into the bottom and top of the ranking (as type 2 in Table 15).
In Western countries the opportunity profiles typically show a large role of socioeconomic back-
ground: parental education and occupation heavily determines the ranking.
In poorer countries with a less usual socioeconomic structure, the role of parental occupation
and education may be less important (and may be imprecisely measured). Other characteristics,
such as birth location or ethnicity, can instead play a substantial role in shaping the opportunity
profiles. This is the case of Ghana, for example, where individuals born in the North are dispropor-
tionately present among worst-off types.
Table 16: Ghana opportunity profile
rank ethnicity birth location parental education sample p.c. consumption 2013
1 Kwa north none 793 917.40
2 others north none 282 923.73
3 Gur north none 11,519 1,103.89
4 Mande north none 244 1,285.88
5 Gur centre none 1,079 1,328.15
6 Gur south none 844 1,536.28
7 Gur north elementary or above 1,722 1,550.71
8 Mande centre none 78 1,561.71
9 Kwa north elementary or above 188 1,567.31
10 others centre none 147 1,570.04
11 Mande south none 67 1,683.66
12 others centre elementary or above 79 1,688.43
13 Mande centre elementary or above 36 1,731.18
14 Gur centre elementary or above 354 1,753.10
15 Kwa south none 7,852 1,792.07
16 Kwa centre none 2,962 1,907.49
17 Mande north elementary or above 23 1,980.65
18 Gur south elementary or above 363 2,154.66
19 Kwa centre elementary or above 3,715 2,181.44
20 others north elementary or above 34 2,257.19
21 others south none 185 2,330.63
22 Kwa south elementary or above 9,799 2,370.11
23 Mande south elementary or above 39 2,554.33
24 others south elementary or above 115 2,565.80
Source: Brunori et al., 2015.
In empirical contribution, the opportunity profiles are often used to identify the “worst-off”
social groups. In particular Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) consider the ordered set of types, ranked
by mean outcome, up until the type that brings the population share of the set over 10 percent.
They call this subset of the opportunity profile the opportunity-deprivation profile. They show
that in Latin America an important role is played by characteristics that identify ethnic or racial
26
minorities. Similarly, Brzezinski (2015) shows that first generation immigrants are largely overrep-
resented among the deprived types in Belgium.
Calculating the opportunity profile or the opportunity-deprivation profile is immediate. We
simply calculate the average outcome and the population share.
3.2.2 Counterfactual distributions
The four counterfactual distributions to calculate inequality of opportunity are then obtained as
follows:
• Y˜EA is obtained replacing individual outcome with the type’s mean outcome: y˜k,ji = µk,.
• Y˜EP is obtained dividing individual outcome by the tranche’s mean outcome: y˜k,ji = µ
k,j
µ.,j
• Y˜DU is obtained selecting the reference tranche, and replacing individual outcome with the
average outcome obtained by individuals in belonging to the same type and exerting reference
effort: y˜k,ji = µ
k,e˜
• Y˜FG is obtained selecting the reference type and dividing individual outcome by the average
outcome of individuals exerting the same degree of effort in the reference type: y˜k,ji =
µk,j
µc˜,j
3.3 Parametric approach
3.3.1 The basic model to estimate Y˜EA
Burguignon et al. (2007) have proposed a regression-based method to estimate Y˜EA. This
method is the most adopted by the empirical literature, has been thoroughly discussed by Ferreira
and Gignoux (2011) and is the method adopted by Wendelspiess and Soloaga (2014) for their Stata
package IOP.
The approach estimates by OLS the outcome generating function:
y = g(C,E, u) (1)
Where C is the vector of circumstances, E the vector of responsibility variables, and u is a
random component which captures variation due to unobserved determinants. Because we know
that effort is in part determined by circumstances the equation can be rewritten as:
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y = g(C,E(C, v), u) (2)
Where v is again a random component.
As suggested by Burguignon et al. (2007) one can quantify the variability due to the vector of
circumstances estimating by OLS the system of equations15:
yi = Ciα + Eiβ + ui (3)
Ei = HCi + vi
Where α and β capture the direct effect of circumstances and effort on the outcome. H is a
matrix of coefficients that capture the effect of circumstances on effort (and therefore their indirect
effect on outcome).
Now, given that many circumstances are not likely to be observable, the error terms will not
be orthogonal to regressors, and our coefficients’ estimate will be biased. This is due to omitted
variables and is another way to understand the problem of partial observability of circumstances
discussed in Section 3.1. However, if we are not interested in the causal link between circumstances
and outcome, but simply in identifying inequality of opportunity, we can use the reduced form of
Equation 3:
yi = Ciα︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+ CiβH︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
+ viβ︸︷︷︸
effort effect
+ ui︸︷︷︸
residual
(4)
Which can be estimated by OLS as:
yi = CiΨ + i (5)
Where Ψ = α + βH and i = viβ + ui.
The ex-ante counterfactual distribution is simply the distribution of the predicted outcomes:
Y˜EA = CΨˆ (6)
The explained variability of this regression model will capture both the direct effect of circum-
15In their original method, the functional form used is log-linear, probably due to its analogy to the Mincer equation,
which has become a standard in this literature. However, as suggested by Ramos and van de Gaer (2015), the use of
the log-linearized functional form is consistent with the majority of the axioms imposed to measure of inequality of
opportunity only if we assume that the outcome of interest is the log of the variable considered. This could be the case
for example of considering a logarithmic utility function.
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stances and the indirect effect that circumstances play, through their effect on effort16.
Our estimates may still be biased if  is correlated with C. This may not be a problem as long as
omitted variables are unobservable circumstances. As discussed for the non-parametric approach,
in this case what we obtain is a lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunity. Therefore, if the
aim is to capture all inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control, biased coefficients
for observable circumstances may improve rather than worsen our estimate.
Consider the example of inequality of opportunity in Rwanda, in which one can use the Enqueˆte
Inte´grale sur les Conditions de Vie des Me´nages, carried out by National Instituteof Statistics of
Rwanda for 2000. The survey contains information about birth location and socioeconomic back-
ground but does not include information about ethnicity, an important circumstance in Rwanda.
When we estimate model (5) the effect of ethnicity will be in part captured by birth location and
socioeconomic background if these variables are correlated with ethnicity. This implies that we
should not interpret estimated coefficients. However, given that ethnicity is a circumstance, we
should not be too concerned if we are simply interested in quantifying inequality due to circum-
stances. Although we do not observe ethnicity, at least some inequality due to ethnicity is captured
by our measure of inequality of opportunity. That is, as long as omitted variables are circumstances,
we will get a downward biased estimation of inequality of opportunity. Unfortunately, there are no
reliable methods to quantify the magnitude of the bias, as Burguignon et al. (2007, 2013) note, and
this aspect is often neglected by the empirical literature.
When estimating the ex-ante counterfactual, the only case in which we are unsure about the sign
of the bias is when responsibility variables are correlated with circumstance. If, for example, indi-
viduals born in a given region tend to work harder, our estimate will capture some of the inequality
due to hard work as inequality associated with birth location. Note however that this possibility can
be ignored if we believe Roemer’s assumption of orthogonality between circumstances and effort
to be correct. According to Roemer, if individuals born in a given region work harder, this is a
characteristic of their type and as such should be considered a source of inequality of opportunity
and not a responsibility variable.
16Note that this would not be the case for a nonlinear model such as a Probit or Logit model (Roemer & Trannoy,
2015).
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3.3.2 Effort identification
It is possible to obtain the other three counterfactual distributions (Y˜EP , Y˜DU , Y˜FG) paramet-
rically, but this would require us to identify effort. Effort can no longer be identified with the
quantile of the type specific outcome distribution. In theory, types exist and are made of all indi-
viduals sharing the same value for all regressors, whereas in practice, especially when one or more
circumstances are continuous, most of the types will be composed by a single individual.
We should distinguish between cases in which effort is observable and cases in which it is not.
Moreover, effort can be unidimensional or multidimensional.
When effort is observable and unidimensional (3) it becomes:
yi = Ciα + βei + ui (7)
ei = Ciγ + vi
Individuals may be responsible for their effort (ei) or for their degree of effort.
If individuals are held responsible for their absolute level of effort, we estimate the first equation
and then we predict the counterfactual distributions as:
YEA : y˜
k,j
i = Ciαˆ (8)
YEP : y˜
k,j
i =
Cαˆ + βˆei
C¯αˆ + βˆei
(9)
Where C¯ is an average of circumstances across all individuals. Going back to our numerical
example, imagine that instead of one individual per cell we have different population shares: black
individuals make up 65% and women 55%. Equation (3.7) will be: yi = α1blacki + α2womeni +
βei + ui. Then YEP is obtained dividing outcomes by 0.65αˆ1 + 0.55αˆ2 + βˆei.
Note that this counterfactual distribution is not exactly the one proposed by Checchi and Per-
agine (2010). We are not dividing the individual outcome by the average outcome of individual
in the tranche. Instead we are dividing the individual outcome by the average outcome that the
population would get if they were all exerting the same level of effort she exerts. If individuals
characterized by different circumstances exert different levels of effort, then the two levels of effort
differ.
Moreover, if instead of a linear specification we are using a nonlinear specification, we should
define C¯ as the combination of circumstances that produces the average outcome, and it will no
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longer be the combination of average circumstances. Think for example at the possibility to intro-
duce in our regression model a circumstance squared to capture some nonlinear relationship. In
this case, the value of the variable that produces the average outcome is no longer the average value
in the distribution, but the root mean square of it.
The direct unfairness counterfactual is obtained by predicting the outcome of all individuals if
they had exerted the reference effort e˜.
YDU : y˜
k,j
i = Ciαˆ + βˆe˜ (10)
The fairness gap counterfactual is obtained by dividing predicted individual outcome by the
predicted outcome of individuals exerting the same level of effort and with reference combination
of circumstances C˜.
YFG : y˜
k,j
i =
Cαˆ + βˆei
C˜αˆ + βˆei
(11)
Where C˜ is the reference combination of circumstances which identifies the reference type.
If individuals are held responsible for their degree of effort we first estimate the second equation
of (7).
ei = Ciγ + vi
The estimated residual vˆi can be interpreted as the effort exerted after we have removed the
effect of circumstances on effort, which Roemer calls ‘the degree of effort’. We then estimate:
yi = Ciα + vˆiγ + ui (12)
And use predicted outcomes for different combination of circumstances and effort to predict the
counterfactual distributions (8), (9), (10), (11). Note that this modifies the vector of coefficients α
which now captures both the direct and the indirect effect of circumstances on outcome. If e and C
are correlated using the degree of effort vˆi instead of the level of effort ei, it implies, ceteris paribus,
that more variability will be explained by circumstances. This is consistent with the fact that now
we are considering individuals only partly responsible for the consequences of their absolute level
effort.
If more than one variable of effort is observable, we should follow different strategies. Li Donni
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et al. (2014), for example, model a measure of health status as a function of both circumstances and
effort variables. They consider three variables of effort: being a smoker, having high education,
having high economic status. They obtain eight effort tranches, a combination of the three dummy
variables. They then use the average outcome in each tranche to rescale individual outcome so as to
obtain the ex post counterfactual distribution YˆEP . Using the same strategy, one can also construct
YˆDU and YˆFG, choosing a reference effort tranche for the former and selecting a reference combi-
nation of circumstances for the latter. This example clarifies that we do not need to have ordinal
variables of effort in order to implement these measures. Categorical variables are ok as far as we
are able to identify effort tranches.
In most of the empirical cases, variables of effort are not directly observable. If and when this
is the case, we should focus on the residuals of the regression (5):
ˆi = yi −CiΨˆ (13)
 captures a mix of measurement error, luck, and effort, but is generally interpreted as effort as
long as it is orthogonal to circumstances. This is not generally the case: residuals are heteroskedas-
tic, their variability tends to correlate with circumstances.
Here we find the same problem we encounter when following a non-parametric approach. We
observe heterogeneity in the distribution of outcome across types and we know that a part of this
heterogeneity is due to the indirect effect of circumstance on outcome (through effort). In the non-
parametric approach, the problem is solved considering the quantile of the outcome distribution
in order to identify a measure of degree of effort orthogonal to circumstances. In the parametric
approach, it is generally impossible to estimate the outcome distribution of individuals sharing the
same value of all regressors.
This solution is adopted by Bio¨rklund et al. (2012). They predict the type-specific variance
of the residual and use it to standardize the residual so as to remove heteroskedasticity. Only the
standardized residual is then considered to be due to effort while the variability of the residual
correlated to circumstances is considered to be due to inequality of opportunity. Bio¨rklund et al.
(2012), however, have a very large sample: they have the entire population of Swedish men born
between 1955 and 1967. Furthermore, they manipulate the variables describing circumstance in
order to get ‘few’ discrete variables which partition the sample into 1,152 types.
In the same vein one can identify the degree of effort by removing the part that is explained by
regressors from the variability of the residual.
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|ˆi| = Ciδ + pii (14)
Where δ is a vector of coefficients that capture the effect of circumstances on the absolute value
of the residual . I am not aware of any empirical estimates based on this definition of effort.
3.4 Nonparametric Vs. parametric estimates
Parametric estimation has been proposed as a good alternative to nonparametric estimation
when the sample size does not allow to reliably estimate types’ mean outcome. If circumstances are
correlated the problem can persist even when a large sample is available. The parametric approach
is more parsimonious because it requires to estimate the average effect of a certain circumstance
on the outcome. Moreover, this allows us to include more circumstances than we could include
adopting the nonparametric approach. Region of birth could be replaced with district of birth
without fear of not getting significant coefficient for the variables. Similarly years of education can
substitute a dummy variable for a high/low level of parental education.
This parsimony is obtained at the cost of a less flexible structure imposed on the function g(c, e)
generally assumed linear or log linear (due to its similarity with the Mincer equation). Table 17
is a good example of the problem we may encounter following a parametric approach. In Guinea,
among the observable circumstances in the Enqueˆte Integre´ de Base pour l’Evaluation de la Pau-
vrete´ (2003) there is area of birth and father occupation (agriculture or other). In the table, informa-
tion is collapsed in order to to clarify how the two circumstances interact. In the rest of the country,
having a father employed in agriculture is associated with lower consumption. By contrast, for in-
dividuals born in the region of Labe, being the child of someone working in agriculture means, on
average, to have higher consumption later in life. Not surprisingly, the Labe region is an important
centre of national and international agricultural trade flows.
Table 17: Non-linear impact of circumstances: the case of Guinea
birth place parental occupation per capita consumption
rest of Guinea agriculture 843.10
rest of Guinea other 1,117.60
Labe other 1,272.88
Labe agriculture 1,805.57
Source: Brunori et al., 2015.
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Figure 1: Trade flows in Guinea (Fonio)
Source: FEWS (2013) p. 4
Such a problem can be easily solved by introducing an interaction term: parental occupation×
birth place in the regression. However, if on the one hand we can include interaction terms and
nonlinear transformation of original variables among the regressors, on the other hand we must be
aware that this will reduce model parsimony and will make our parametric approach very similar to
the non-parametric approach17. This is especially true if regressors are non-cardinal variables. Gen-
der, ethnicity, area of birth, and parental occupation are categorical variables. To run a regression on
non-cardinal variables, we have to transform them into sets of dummies. Each dummy will capture
a shift in the intercept of the regression line which represents the advantage/disadvantage of being
characterized by a certain value of the circumstance. In such a regression, if we were to interact all
circumstances we would be estimating an intercept for all combination of circumstances–that is,
we are back to non-parametric approach.
For these reasons, non-parametric estimates of inequality of opportunity are preferable to para-
metric estimates, which are themselves preferable when cardinal circumstances are observed. Parental
income serves as a good example: in a non-parametric approach, we would need to partition
parental income into quantiles in order to obtain types with a large sample size. In such a case,
one might better approximate the effect of parental income on the offspring outcome by estimat-
ing an OLS in which parental income and some nonlinear transformation of it are included among
17See Hufe and Pichl (2015) on the effect assuming linearity when estimating parametrically inequality of oppor-
tunity.
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regressors.
4 Inequality of opportunity index
The large majority of the contributions have proposed a synthetic index of equal opportunity.
Such indexes are obtained applying an inequality measure to one of the counterfactual distributions.
Following the methodology proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010) the largest part of the authors
use the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD).
MLD(y) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
µ
yi
(15)
Note that MLD is the generalised entropy index when its parameter is set to zero. The reason
why it was proposed is that it is a path-independent perfectly decomposable inequality index. As
shown by Foster and Shneyerov (2000) the only inequality measure that satisfies path independence
decomposability, uses the arithmetic mean as the reference, and that satisfies the Pigou-Dalton
transfer axiom is the MLD18.
This property is exploited in empirical application to decompose total inequality in two parts:
the share due to opportunity and a residual. If we have a population partitioned into n subgroups
(types):
MLD(y) = MLD(µ1, ..., µk, ..., µn) +
n∑
k=1
wkMLD(yi)i∈k (16)
Where wk is the type k’s population share and (µ1, ..., µk, ..., µn) = Y˜EA . It follows that total
inequality can be decomposed into inequality of opportunity and a residual term. Moreover, it
makes sense to calculate what is the share of inequality due to opportunity:
IOpREA =
MLD(Y˜EA)
MLD(y)
(17)
The same kind of decomposition can be obtained for the compensation consistent measure (ex-
post). In this case we have:
18Path independence means that inequality between (within) groups can be calculated both directly or subtracting
the within (between) groups inequality from total inequality. Both paths yield the same values.
35
MLD(y) = MLD(µ1, ..., µ
j, ..., µm) +
m∑
j=1
wkMLD(yi)i∈j (18)
Where (µ1, ..., µj, ..., µm) is the distribution of tranches’ mean and
∑m
j=1 wkMLD(yi)i∈j =
Y˜EP , therefore:
IOpREP =
MLD(Y˜EP )
MLD(y)
(19)
Beside its perfect decomposability the MLD has two main limitations: it is not very intuitive
and it is unbounded. Two weaknesses rarely acknowledge by the literature.
An other inequality index (less frequently) used is the Gini coefficient:
Gini(y) =
1
N
(
N + 1− 2
∑N
i=1(N + 1− i)yi∑N
i=1 yi
)
(20)
In this case we can measure inequality of opportunity as the Gini of the counterfactual distri-
bution. The meaning of the number obtained, and its relationship with the Lorenz curve of the
counterfactual distributions, is well known. However, whenever the ranges of the groups specific
outcome distribution present some overlapping we know that Gini is not perfectly decomposable.
In the case of ex-ante inequality of opportunity for example we get:
Gini(y) = Gini(Y˜EA) +
n∑
k=1
akwk Gini(yi)i∈k +K (21)
Where ak is the outcome share of type k and K > 0 whenever the group-specific distributions
of outcome overlap. In this case we cannot identify the share of inequality due to opportunity be-
cause K is technically nor part of the between-group neither of the within-group inequality.
Recently Brunori at al. (2015) and Checchi et al. (2015) have noticed that estimates of the
share of total inequality due to opportunity based on MLD tend to be much lower than estimates
obtained with Gini. This is counterintuitive because given the non-decomposability of the Gini
we would expect the Gini between types (and within tranches) to capture a smaller share of total
inequality (the residual is not in the nominator but is part of the denominator). Brunori at al. (2015)
suggest that this is due to the higher sensitivity of the MLD to outlier values. When constructing
the counterfactual distributions we are by definition removing extreme values from total inequality.
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This smoothing reduces more inequality as measured by an index more sensitive to extreme values.
To get an intuition of this consider Figure 2 which was obtained simulating a lognormal distribution
of 1,000 observations with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. At each step the highest observation
is subtracted from the distribution and both MLD and Gini are calculated. What is plotted in the
vertical axis of Figure 2 is the percentage change in each one of the two measures at each step
(horizontal axis). Overlooking the last steps in which there are few observation and changes in
inequality become random, what we can see is that the reduction in MLD is always higher in
absolute term than the reduction in the Gini. This property - never proved by the literature to the
best of my knowledge - does not depend on the standard deviation of the distribution and holds also
for a normal distribution.
Figure 2: Sensitivity to extreme values: MLD Vs. Gini
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1,000 observations lognormally distributed with µ = 0, σ = 1.
At each step the highest value is removed from the sample.
This property is shown in Figure 3 which reports share of total inequality due to opportunity
in Europe calculated using both Gini and MLD. MLD between types captures less then half of the
inequality captured by Gini between types.
The fact that Gini and MLD produce very different result is worrisome. Which inequality index
should be preferred in empirical applications?
My personal opinion is that the Gini is to be preferred not only because its meaning is well
known but also because MLD seems to be very sensitive to the removal of extreme values. More-
over, recall that we can always compare total inequality in the direct unfairness gap and direct
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Figure 3: Share of total inequality due to opportunity: MLD Vs. Gini in Europe
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Source: Brunori (2015), IOpEA is based on EU-SILC data 2011.
unfairness distributions but it makes no sense to try to identify the share of inequality due to oppor-
tunity that could be higher than 100%.
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5 Extensions
5.1 Inequality of opportunity decomposition by sources
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) suggest that “[...] the parametric approach might permit the es-
timation of the partial effects of one (or a subset) of the circumstance variables, controlling for
the others” p. 16. We follow exactly their example: IOpEA is estimated parametrically with a
log-normal OLS model and inequality is evaluated with MLD.
ln y = CΨˆ +  (22)
Y˜EA = Exp
{
CiΨˆ
}
(23)
Given the decomposability properties of MLD Inequality of opportunity can be measured fol-
lowing two paths:
IOPEA = MLD
(
CΨˆ
)
(24)
or
IOPEA = MLD (Y )−MLD
(
V˜
)
(25)
Where V˜ = C¯Ψˆ + ˆ and C¯ is an average of circumstances across all individuals.
The marginal contribution of each circumstance can then be obtained exploiting the last defini-
tion by constructing an alternative counterfactual distribution:
V˜ ji = Exp
{
C¯ji Ψˆ
j + Ck 6=ji Ψˆ
k 6=j + ˆi
}
(26)
In this counterfactual distribution all circumstances takes their actual values but circumstance j
which equalized to its average for all individuals.
IOP jEA = MLD (Y )−MLD
(
V˜ j
)
(27)
Is inequality of opportunity due to opportunity j.
For the case of parametric ex-ante inequality of opportunity based on MLD, partial contribu-
tions are easily calculated using the package iop developed by Wendelspiess and Soloaga (2014).
Figure 4 reports the decomposition of total inequality of opportunity by sources as estimated for
Australia by Martinez et al. (2015) using the routine iop for STATA (see the next paragraph for
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details).
Figure 4: IOpEA decomposed by source: Australia 2001-2013
Source: Martinez et al.,2015 p. 25.
5.1.1 iop STATA routine
The routine iop written for STATA by Wendelspiess & Soloaga (2014) can be used to estimate
a number of inequality of opportunity measures.
The defoult command is:
iop dependant variable independent variables
It returns three values:
Where Ferreira-Gignoux without scale is theR2 of the OLS regression (explained variance over
total variance). This last measure is considered by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011b) as the most appro-
priate measure when dealing with a continuous variables that are the result of a standardization, test
scores in education for example. This because in these cases a MLD and Gini of the pre and post
standardization distributions are not ordinal equivalent, that is the ranking in terms of inequality
of two distribution may differ before and after standardization. The variance instead is not prob-
lematic from this perspective and is also additive decomposable. However, using the variance the
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Table 18: iop routing default output
absolute relative
Ferreira-Gignoux (with scale) IOpEA = MLD
(
CΨˆ
)
IOpREA =
MLD(CΨˆ)
MLD(Y )
Ferreira-Gignoux (without scale) IOpREA =
V AR(CΨˆ)
V AR(Y )
absolute measure is not interpretable because its value depends on the stardadization method.
A number of options are allowed, among them:
detail: shows the output of the regression used to estimate the counterfactual distribution,
bootstrap(number of samples): calculates bootstrapped standard error of the inequality of
opportunity measure,
shapley(independent variables): decomposes the inequality of opportunity measure in the
relative contribution of each circumstance variable based on the Shapley value (this, under
very strong assumptions, is equivalent to identify the relative causal effect of each circum-
stance on outcome).
Using the option shapley one can obtain the decomposition proposed by Ferreira and Gignoux
and discussed in the previous paragraph. Because the Shapley value decomposition is computation-
ally very intensive it is advisable to group circumstances using the option sgroups(circumstance1
circumstance2, circumstance3,... ). One can for example group all circumstances describing
parental occupation or group variables describing regions in set of variables describing macro areas.
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5.2 Human Opportunity Index
The World Bank has recently started to compile the Human Opportunity Index (HOI), a statistic
based on the coverage rate of a number of essential services. Estimates of HOI were published for
the first time in Paes de Barros et al. (2009). Here we follow Chapter 2 of Dabalen et al. (2015)
which is a good introduction to the methodology, a complete discussion can be found in Paes de
Barros et al. (2010).
The HOI is calculated for the access of children to basic services and goods which can be
considered prerequisites needed for childhood development. The list may varies depending on
data availability but generally include access to safe water, access to electricity, access to primary
education, access to immunization.
The authors define HOI a measure of “equality of opportunity-sensitive coverage rate”. This
means that HOI for a certain basic need increases with overall coverage and decreases with inequal-
ity in coverage due to circumstances beyond individual control.
To construct an index with these two properties they calculate the average coverage rate Y¯ and
a measure of between-type inequality in access to the service, D. HOI is then:
HOI = Y¯ × (1−D)
The between-type inequality measure is obtained first identifying circumstances beyond indi-
vidual control and partitioning the population in types. Then the average access rate of each type,
Yk is used to calculate D:
D =
1
2Y¯
n∑
k=1
wk|Y¯ − Yk| (28)
Where wk is the share of group k in total population and n is the number of types. The index D
is reward-consistent measure of inequality of opportunity, more precisely is an ex-ante measure of
inequality of opportunity because it evaluates inequality of opportunity as inequality in the counter-
factual distribution made of type-specific coverage rates. The dissimilarity index can be interpreted
looking at Figure 5 which plots the percentage of individuals completing sixth grade education on
time (vertical axis) as function of the ventile of the income distribution their household belongs to
(horizontal axis). The horizontal line (slightly above 50 percent) represents the percentage in the
entire population that completed sixth grade on time. The point where the type-specific coverage
rates curve and the average coverage line cross divides the population into two groups: the vulnera-
ble (or worse-off) types, with a coverage rate below Y¯ and the non-vulnarable (or better-off) types,
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Figure 5: A graphical representation of the dissimilarity index D
Source: Adapted from Paes de Barros, 2009 p. 65.
with a coverage above the average. The shaded area represents the sum of gaps between type-
specific percentage and the overall percentage. The left-hand shaded area can be interpreted as “the
fraction of available opportunities that need to be reassigned from better-off groups to worse-off
groups to achieve equal opportunity for all.” Paes de Barros (2009) p. 65. The right-hand shaded
area is by definition equal to the left-hand shaded area (and this explains why the sum of the gaps
is divided by two in equation 28).
HOI have a number of properties:
a) HOI ranges between Y¯ 2 and Y¯ . Takes value Y¯ when D = 0, that is when Yk = Y¯
∀k = 1, ..., n. It takes value Y¯ 2 when the coverage is 100% for Y¯ share of the population and
is 100% for (1− Y¯ ) share of the population.
b) HOI is sensitive to the coverage scale: if the coverage increases (decreases) by a factor δ,
HOI increases by the same factor.
c) HOI is sensitive to redistribution: if the coverage of a non-vulnerable type is decreased in
favour of a vulnerable type, holding constant the average coverage in the population, HOI does not
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decreases19.
d) HOI is insensitive to redistribution among vulnerable or non-vulnerable types.
e) sub-group inconsistency: HOI cannot be decomposed into HOI calculated for subgroups of
the population. Take the example of regions in a country, it can be the case that HOI declines in
a region, remains the same in all the other regions, but increases for the entire population. The
intuition of this is that the effect of transfers of coverage between types depends on whether they
are worse-off or better-off types. A type may be better-off in a subgroup but worse-off in the pop-
ulation.
Property d) and e) may be considered undesirable but they can be solved calculating the Geo-
metric Human Opportunity Index (G-HOI). G-HOI is obtained as the geometric mean of the type-
specific coverage rates. It is both strictly sensitive to redistribution and subgroup-consistent.
An other interesting property of this index is that changes in HOI can be decomposed in: 1)
a scale effect which refers to chances in the average coverage in the population, 2) a distribution
effect which refers to changes in the between-group inequality in coverage holding constant the
coverage rate in the population.
Consider the change of HOI over time:
∆HOI = HOIt1 −HOIt0 = Y¯t1(1−Dt1)− Y¯t0(1−Dt0)
Adding and subtracting Y¯t1(1−Dt0) we get a decomposition:
scale effect : Y¯t1(1−Dt0)− Y¯t0(1−Dt0)
and
distribtuion effect : Y¯t1(1−Dt1)− Y¯t1(1−Dt0)
Azevedo et al. (2010) have developed a STATA package to estimate and decompose HOI. The
estimation of Yk is based on a parametric estimation of the conditional probabilities of access the
service given a vector of circumstances (C). A logistic model is estimated:
19And it increases if the non-vulnerable from which some coverage is subtracted does not become vulnerable.
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ln
[
Pr {y = 1|C}
1− Pr {y = 0|C}
]
= CΨ (29)
The coverage of individual i with circumstances Ci can then be predicted using the estimated
coefficients:
yˆi =
Exp
{
ˆCiΨ
}
1 + Exp
{
ˆCiΨ
} (30)
And used to calculate HOI:
ˆHOI = ˆ¯Y
(
1− 1
2 ˆ¯Y
N∑
n=1
wi| ˆ¯Y − yˆi|
)
(31)
For a sufficiently low number of types we could estimate non-parametrically HOI simply cal-
culating the average coverage for each type. The authors of the package however have chosen to
adopt the parametric approach and suggest not to include interaction terms in the analysis espe-
cially if the sample size is small (Dabalen et al., 2015).
HOI can be calculated using the STATA routine hoi:
hoi dependent variable independent variables
It returns a table of results which include: the average coverage rate (Y¯ ), the dissimilarity index
(D), HOI , the share of vulnerable population and part of the output of the logit regression used to
predict type-specific coverage rates.
The use of the option , by returns a counterfactual using the coefficients from an alternative
period in time or place.
Finally, a composite HOI index has been proposed in order to obtain a single scalar which
aggregates access to multiple goods and services for children. To compute the composite HOI one
has to construct a variable which takes value 1 if the child is covered by all the goods and services
and takes value 0 otherwise. Then the composite HOI is computed with the same formula (5.2).
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